This paper analyzes economic forces in Nepal's tourism market. Market actors' utility maximization results in inefficient supply and demand outcomes and unsustainable ecotourism. This result is in direct contradiction to the stated goals of the actors, but predictable in the context of the tourism market structure. Proposed solutions include improved property rights and a change in government objectives.
Introduction
Surely you've heard of Nepal? This Shangri-La of the imagination is filled with tall mountains, lush forests, deep snow, exotic people, strange religious ceremonies -and touristsseeking nature, themselves, answers. No other place, except perhaps Tibet, draws us like Nepal.
Nepal also has poverty and misery: per capita income is $220; life expectancy is about 58 years (Asia Tradehub website). When tourists visit Nepal -two thirds come from wealthy countries -the first and third worlds come into direct contact with unexpected results. Many of the tourists who visit Nepal as well as international observers of the country believe that tourism is good for the country. In this paper, I will argue to the contrary. Ironically, Nepal's ecotourism 1 industry is ecologically and culturally unsustainable for its people and its future. The explanation for this conclusion is complex (read on. . . ) but begins and ends with power.
In this paper, I will describe how the structure of the tourism "business" not only produces harmful effects but impedes attempts to reduce them. The economic motivations, limitations and interactions of the several actors are critical to understanding both the observed balance and hypothesizing change to it.
2 By understanding the underlying economics at work, participants in Nepal's ecotourism industry have a better chance at true sustainability.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section introduces the reader to the country. Section three reviews the economics of tourism in Nepal. Section four introduces the actors in the tourism market and delves into their economic motivation and observed actions. Section five models the current situation and alternative scenarios. Section six concludes. Nepal is a medium country 3 of 24 million people south of the Himalayan mountain range in Asia. Due to the extreme variation in altitude (from 70 to 8,848m), it possesses some of the most diverse climates in the world. 4 With these climates come an amazing range of topography, flora and fauna -think Hawaii on steroids.
The cultural diversity of Nepal is no different. There are over sixty-five races and tribesdivided and mixed with respect to latitude and altitude into an amazing panoply of human adaption (HMG-Nepal, 2002) . Nepal is an enchanting part of the world and many people (re-)visit because of what they have heard, seen or experienced. During my world travels, I visited in 1998 and again in 1999 as a tourist.
Nepal's economy has several important characteristics. Tourism accounts for only 3.8 percent of GDP but 18 percent of foreign exchange; carpet and textile exports account for most of the foreign exchange.
5 About 10 -15 percent of tourism revenue goes to the government, the rest goes to 275,000 people in the tourism industry (NepalNet). 80 percent of Nepalis work in agriculture (40 percent of GDP). International aid has a large impact, funding over 28 percent of total budgetary expenditures, 40 percent of public sector programs and/or 60 percent of development (Asia Tradehub website; Nepal, 2000; Wells, 1993) .
The tourist economy of Nepal stands on four legs: the Kathmandu valley, site of the national capital, many tourist attractions and most of Nepal's economic infrastructure; Chitwan National Park (NP), a reserve in the Terai formed by removing all its inhabitants; Sagarmatha NP, the park containing Mount Everest and most of the Sherpa population;
6 and the Annapurna Conservation Area (ACAP) -home to over forty thousand people and high peaks -founded in 1986 and fairly successful 7 at managing tourism (Zurick, 1992; Nepal, 2000; Brown et al., 1997; Wells, 1993) .
Tourism Market Structure and Tourism in Nepal
Visualize tourism as a series of markets within markets: hotels compete within competing neighborhoods within competing cities within competing countries; all seek the tourist's custom. Papatheodorou (2001) models this competition between destinations and tourist choices in Figure 2 . Attractions (eg, nature) are on one axis and facilities (eg, restaurants) are on the other. A tourist sees each destination as a vector whose slope depends on its mix of attractions and facilities (the length of the vector line does not matter). On each vector are dots for time (travel to the location) and cost (once at the location); dots which are closer to the origin represent less attractive characteristics (e.g., higher cost is closer).
The tourist chooses between destinations according to their intersections with the tourist's indifference curve(s). Intersections close to the origin are at a lower utility than those farther away so the tourist will select the destination which allows them to be on the highest indifference curve. If there are changes in the time to arrive or cost to stay at a location, the location's attractiveness changes -possibly changing the tourist's choice. If a number of tourists decide against a location, the demand curve of tourists for that location shifts in (see Figure 5 ).
Let's say that two destinations in Figure 2 have two different customers (Family traveller -with steeper IC F amily -goes to Disneyland; Adventure traveller -with a preference for attractions and flatter IC Adventure -goes to Nepal) based on the intersection of their indifference curves with the destination lines. Each traveller chooses the destination because it best matches their individual indifference curve. When there is a shock to the reputation of Nepal, its characteristics change (the line tilts to the right and the characteristics of 5 Most Tibetan carpets are made in Nepal and ever-less-frequently by actual Tibetans. 6 Sherpas are an ethnic group from Tibet and possess a deserved reputation for being the true Men of the Mountains; they were the first guides for foreigners and "sherpa" is now interchangeable with "guide."
7 This paper will not compare the results of tourism in these locations but point to overall weaknesses in the system that ACAP has countered with more success; these successes are limited to some local impacts. Systemic weaknesses still adversely affect ACAP and are the subject of this paper. All areas have carrying capacity problems from systemic weakness. The impacts of tourists in Lumbini NP (in the western Terai), Langtang (north of Kathmandu), Upper Mustang (a remote region near Tibet), and other, less-visited, areas fall into a similar pattern of "excessive" resource consumption with visible and measurable degradation of the environment. time and cost shift to new location). The adventure traveller no longer has a choice on the upper indifference curve and has to shift to a lower indifference curve -which now favors Disneyland.
Using this model, it is possible to intuitively analyze jostling among global tourist destinations for business. 8 A change in reputation or perceived logistics can have a dramatic impact on tourist demand as vectors, dots, and indifference curves interact. Nepal (2000) notes that His Majesty's Government (HMG) and the tourism industry are anxious to maintain the image of Nepal as Shangri-La and avoid quotes like this:
The [tourism] industry has caused significant environmental impact in the Himalayan protected areas. Its policies in Nepal are dictated by the need to earn foreign exchange; sustainability of its resources (natural, cultural and human) has been largely ignored. None of the destination areas [ACAP, Sagarmatha, Upper Mustang] have management plans.
- Nepal (2000) The irony is that other events have given an adverse shock to Nepal's reputation and arrivals have dropped precipitously (See Figure 3 ).
9
Nepal has had success with tourism, but the market structure is changing. Zurick (1992) 8 The Economist witnessed the scrum at the 1997 World Travel Market -4,400 companies and 158 countries vying for attention (2002 figures were 4,888 and 184). 1998a 9 Derek Berwald, my professor, pointed out that the drop in the number of tourist visits by about half as a result of 9/11, the royal family assassination and an escalating rebellion by self-styled "Maoist" rebels was a good example of "environmental protection via political upheaval." claims that HMG is opening new areas to maintain revenue growth in a market that cannot consolidate. HMG says its goal is development of "backward" regions. Both of these reasons are puny compared to the numbers in consideration: HMG is planning for 1.25 million annual arrivals in 2015 -see the "9 th plan" line in Figure 3 (Raj, 2001 ). This number is five times current levels, over twice current facility capacity and way beyond carrying capacity. To understand how "puny" these reasons are, consider one recently-opened region (Upper Mustang) which has about a thousand annual visitors, with each perhaps spending $1,000 on their visit to Mustang. Given that backward regions are rare and opening slowly (maybe two per decade), HMG has not found a solution. Potentially the reason that these regions are being opened is to either create news events for tourism publications or to please development advocates who want to see the tourism industry expand.
If newly-opened regions are not going to handle the increase, why are they coming and where are they going to go? The first answer is easy: foreign exchange which is valuable to all actors in the tourism industry. The second is also easy: where they are already going (the four legs -ACAP, Chitwan, Kathmandu, and Sagarmatha NP).
Economics of Tourism in Nepal
This paper uses the economic notions of supply and demand as an analytical framework. In the "perfect world" economists imagine, buyers demand and sellers supply. Each has perfect information about the other; each pays the full costs and receives the full benefits of trade. They only trade when each stands to make a "profit" or at least not lose money (i.e., in the absence of Pareto optimality). Below, I will describe two major exceptions to this perfect world: property rights and externalities, which distort costs and benefits on the supply side; and imperfect information and corruption, which distorts both the prices and quantities on the demand side.
Property Rights
. . . and [write] a letter to Asaph, the keeper of the king's forest, that he must give me timber to make beams for the gates of the citadel which pertains to the temple, for the city, and for the house that I will occupy.
-Nehemiah 2:8 (ca. 420 BCE)
The ownership of natural resources has been important ever since Rousseau's noble savage founded modern society with "This is Mine!" (1755). In Nepal, the forest has been as a source of wood and, for over 200 years, tax revenue. In 1978, the government declared forests (some privately held or managed) to be a publicly-owned resource managed by the community (Acharya) . Although deforestation ranges from severe in the Terai to net non-existent in the Mountain zone, over-exploitation worsened in Himalayan areas local to tourism (Soussan et al., 1995; Walder, 2000) . Solow (1974) mentions that a social discount rate lower than the investment discount rate results in over-exploitation of a resource. If none own the resource, ownership is insecure, and/or the return to ownership is less than the return to extraction (converting a tree into a television, for example), then the resource will be over-consumed. In Nepal, all of these conditions are true.
The tourism industry then magnifies the damage. When measuring the effects of trekkers (tourists walking in national parks), include the two Nepalis who support each trekker. Most supplies are brought in to the high parks -only water and scenery exist in abundance.
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In Sagarmatha NP, officials cannot regulate the use of wood by lodges, which import 125 mt per year from outside the park and use wood from inside the park.
11 Inside cutting has a long history. In 1976, Eckholm noticed entrepreneurs poaching firewood in the "legally protected, ecologically and economically essential national forest reserves" (p 103). Overall, "Tourist load" adds 85 percent to base fuel consumption (Nepal, 2000) . Although tourists are prepared to and do pay for the wood they consume, they are paying the cost demanded by a wood seller -not necessarily a forest owner.
The fact is that there are few, if any, property rights with respect to forest or trees in Nepal. Publicly-owned property can be stolen through stealth, deception, bribery or mere opportunity. Private property, in contrast, is protected up to its market value. In the next section, we will see how non-market values change decisions but continue to impose costs via externalities.
10 The private provision of porterage ensures that prices rise with travel distance. 11 I think that 125 mt is either far too small or a frightening indicator of the cutting going on inside the park. A sherpa household will use five mt over a whole year of cooking and heating.
Externalities
Many discussions of economic policy -macroeconomics aside -boil down to a tension between market allocation and public intervention. Marketeers keep thinking about the donut of allocative efficiency and informational economy and dirigistes are impressed with the size of the hole containing externalities, imperfections and distributional issues. So it is with exhaustable resources.
- Solow (1974, p13) If the price of a product reflects its true and total costs, economists say that supply and demand are efficient and that there is no reason to interfere the market. When costs of an activity are not reflected in its price, we say externalities exist. If tourists' firewood supplies cost less than the market price (which tourism operators may circumvent), local people and the environment 12 bear the cost of that externality. This paper is not about that finding, but how various actors with power can and do choose to ignore it -in their own self-interest. Tour operators, tourists and government make larger profits when they avoid externality costs.
Economists recommend that externalities be internalized into market prices, which will then act as an accurate signal. Non-economic solutions are ineffective. Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" (1968) is a classic example. He hoped that population control would take effect via a "change in morality;" the Chinese government has tried to achieve the same with force and without long-term success. Solutions need to come from self-interest.
Imperfect Information and Demand
The soaring number of trekkers in the high Himalayas over the last decade has created a booming firewood business for some mountain people, but it has grown at the expense of the forests and particularly fragile ecosystems of the upper slopes.
- Eckholm (1976, p 99) Imperfect information affects demand by changing the perceptions people have of the product they consume and the cost of that consumption. Tourist destinations prefer to not call attention to problems for fear of losing business. 13 Outsiders also like the situation to be good, so they can enjoy a guilt-free vacation.
14 National Geographic has a well-deserved reputation as a cheerleader for armchair travellers and friend of governments in exotic destinations. In 1989, National Geographic cited the success of the ACAP in preserving the local culture and environment (Rowell, 1989) .
15 The 12 By definition, activities with externalities are non-sustainable because costs will not rise fast enough to counter "too much" demand.
13 If Nepal is "degraded," it is less desirable; this is captured in the phrase "see it before it's spoiled" (Zurick, 1992) . In economics, we would say that the demand curve shifts in -to a lower demand at every price level -when people perceive that the good is less desirable.
14 There are long-running and energetic debates about the ethics of visiting Tibet or Burma due to the effects on either the people there (good) or assistance to their odious governments (bad). A similar case can be made with respect to tourism in ecologically-fragile areas. 15 King claims that ACAP was a good thing for the people of Annapurna, since they faced imminent environmental ruin. That is probably true, but prior unsustainable tourism caused that "ruin" (King and success of ACAP shifted the demand curve out and increased the quantity of tourists across all price-levels. Nepal (2000) says that arrivals to the Annapurna area increased 56 percent after the establishment of the ACAP in 1986. This is not a problem if the demanders of tourism pay the full price of their presence, but it is if their presence pushes a place beyond its carrying capacity. Although the designers of ACAP (who came from the World Wildlife Fund) claimed their project to be a success, failure to consider some economic effects 16 -either by design or implementation -means that externalities persist (Bunting et al., 1991) . ACAP, as I mentioned before, has been more successful at addressing local issues such as deforestation, energy consumption, and water supplies but suffers from the same government policies as other locations with respect to property rights, tourism permits, central government interference, etc. -diluting the gains of its unique structure.
In May 2003, National Geographic, while mentioning dramatic transformations in Sherpa culture, not only had an admiring tone as to their ability to "progress" towards our cultural norms [my word] but also noted, without qualification, that the creation of Sagarmatha NP "to protect the area from environmental degradation, turned virtually all of Khumbu into a state-regulated area." (p60). As you read above [in §3.1] , the creation of a park did not stop the degradation.
The result of imperfect information is that tourists cannot adjust their demand to reflect the damage occurring in Nepal. If they could, the demand curve would shift in (eg, in Figure 5 ), reducing the amount of damage and providing an incentive for HMG and the tourism operators to correct the situation.
On the other side of the information market, we may have too much bad news. Researchers and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) have an incentive to keep the situation in Nepal critical, but not quite fatal, so that they can continue to study the problem, publish and justify fundraising and/or budgetary spending. Keep this in mind when I propose areas for further study in §6!
Corruption
In his plea to save the environment, Garrett Hardin (1968) warned us not to trust an institutional guard: "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?"
17 If bureaucrats are not acting in the people's best interest, it is hard to either notice or correct their activities. In "The Tragedy of the Commons Revisited," political scientist Crowe (1969) predicts that the administrator of the commons will be captured by "small, coordinated and focused" groups. Case-in-point [emphases added]:
The Nepal Tourism Board (NTB) is a National Organization newly established by an act of Parliament in the form of partnership between His Majesty's Government, and the private sector tourism industry of Nepal. The NTB will now be responsible for all the marketing activities aimed at promoting Nepal as a premier destination. Although the initial phase of the functioning of the Board will be focussed in marketing and promotion, the ultimate aim of the NTB is to take over regulatory and product Stewart, 1996; Bunting et al., 1991) .
16 There are some notable exceptions -such as rewarding guards of nurseries with a portion of the fines from those caught illegally logging; this has a hole, of course -counter bribes.
17 Who watches the watchers?
development activities as well. The functioning of the NTB has the commitment and the support of the Government as well as the dynamism of the private sector. The Board is an autonomous institution consisting of 11 Board Members (the Secretary at the MOTCA as Chairman and 4 ex-officio members from Government Ministries and 6 from among the private sector representatives including the Chief Executive Officer ). The Board has been created to provide a vision drawn leadership, continuity of promotional efforts, good management and guidance to Nepal's tourism industry. The funds for the NTB will be collected from the entire tourism related businesses in the form of tourist service fee, thereby keeping it financially independent. The Board is working towards repositioning the image of the country so as to market and promote Nepal aggressively and extensively both domestically and internationally. This is very crucial as Nepal, though small in size, has immense cultural and natural diversity and is one of the most beautiful countries in the world. The friendliness and hospitality of the people of Nepal, where guests are treated as Gods; the variety of exciting adventure activities including trekking, mountaineering, rafting and jungle safari combined with culture that epitomizes peace and harmony; art and craft; songs and dances make a visit to Nepal a memorable experience. We feel proud and honored to welcome you to Nepal. -Nepal Tourism Board (2003) Mismanagement and regulatory capture are steps on the road to corruption, with increasingly clear results: human talent goes into rent-seeking 18 -not productive enterprize; funding goes to opaque government programs (eg, infrastructure or defence) whose results are hard to document and budget easy to waylay -not education and medicine; and capitalintensive resource industries have the greatest concentration of "rent-collectors," since they offer the highest return to effort -unlike agriculture with too many scattered participants. Rapid growth, chaotic political or legal systems contribute to corruption by decreasing the chance of getting noticed or caught; Nepal has all three (Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Abed and Gupta, 2002) .
Tourism is vulnerable to corruption. Bureaucrats like it because tourism depends on natural resources and provides a concentrated source of foreign exchange, free from measurement constraints. Tourism operators like it because ever-present bribe-seekers can be paid off with smaller-than-average bribes 19 to reduce taxes -increasing profits in two ways. Using public goods (like trees) and paying a portion of their value to corrupt bureaucrats, guards, or thieves increases profits a third way.
Economic Actors
The actors in Nepal's tourism market all have their own utility-maximizing functions. Their interactions in the market produce the non-sustainable result that we worry about today. Below, I review the characteristics of each actor in decreasing order of power with respect to Nepal's tourism market. I have included basic utility functions for each actor as a convenient summary of their characteristics -although I may not cover them all. traveltime, amenities, attractions, environmental impact . . .) Forty-three million Americans consider themselves ecotourists and will pay to be. When they (and others like them) arrive in Nepal, it is after making a decision involving factors of price, time and anticipated benefits. Tourists will be pleased if cost, travel time and environmental impact are low and if amenities and attractions are high. In fact, costs are very low due to high facility capacity and Nepal's generally low costs, travel time is falling, and amenities are available to suit most tastes. The most important factors for the ecotourists are the attractions (parks and mountains) and their impact. The government and tour operators see the parks and mountains as both unique (attracting rents) and inviolate (meaning there is no concern of exceeding carrying capacity). If tourists see either the mountains as less pristine or their tourism as damaging, they will either value it less (and pay less) or not undertake it at all, shifting in their demand curve (See Figure 5 ).
Tourists -Buyers
U ecotourist = f (cost,
Tourism Operators -Retail Sellers
Tour operators include international as well as domestic guides, lodges and travel companies. Their desire for profits means charging as much as possible and paying as little as possible. Foreign tour agencies are very capable of extracting the maximum profit -charging first world prices for tours and paying third world wages (Papatheodorou, 2001 ).
In Nepal, the competition for foreign business is fierce (as one can conclude by the number of businesses in the Thamel tourist district of Kathmandu). The Sherpas are the notable exception to the perfect competition rule (Nepal, 2000) . In Sagarmatha NP, they monopolize the local provision of goods and services, frequently subcontracting the less-profitable work (porterage of goods and wood) to other tribes unable to say "I am Sherpa, Khumbu is my home." Therefore, we can point to four sources of profits: ethnic rents, free inputs (eg, wood) which lower costs, rents to capital (eg, lodge owners), and the imperfect information profit one can earn by being in the right place at the right time with the right person (the "score" -I once paid a schoolboy Rs.30 ($0.50) to get us onto the (purposely?) unmarked trail -10 minutes work; he wanted Rs.200!).
Walder (2000) traces the evolution of porterage, lodges and fuel wood consumption back to one event: the 1979 ban on the collecting wood. Since the restriction on collecting wood was not applied to lodges, which would provide the benefits of wood without charging, demand shifted from porter-assisted treks to "tea-house" treks and shifted out too; lower organizational and marginal costs increased trekker volume as trekkers went without porters and paid less for the benefits of heat. In reaction to increased demand from the tea-house trekkers, the number of lodges rose from 7 in 1973 to 81 in 1991; consumption of up to 75kg of firewood per day and of timber for building has had a severe impact in and around the Park.
Lodge owners are happy about increased tourist demand for three reasons: first, since they already have paid building costs (their fixed or "sunk " costs) high volume goes to the bottom line -or their lender; second, because their best customers are at the low (cheap and plentiful) end of the market; 20 third, because of the limited season -two thirds of arrivals in one third of the year -the only way to make money in the presence of high capacity is to maximize visits and revenue when tourists are willing to visit (Brown et al., 1997) .
Multilateral Organizations and NGO's -Regulators
It seems that Multilateral Organizations such as World Bank, UN, IMF, etc. and the ten-thousand-plus NGO's in Nepal (MONGO's) have more power than HMG; although MONGO's would find other work if Nepal disappeared, HMG couldn't function without their "assistance." There are significant selfish reasons for MONGO's and their employees to work in Nepal (lifestyle, job fulfillment, etc.), but I will concentrate on their mission and the two principal ways they advance it: direct funding and policy influence.
HMG receives 28 percent of its budget funding from MONGO's (Wells, 1993, p 445) . Knack (2001) found that an increase in the amount of aid caused a decrease in a country's ICRG rating for government quality. 21 The effects of large flows of aid can include displacement of citizen influence on policy as tax revenue declines in importance, widespread rent-seeking, and even, perversely, leaving populations poor so as to qualify for aid. Overall, Knack found that a 25 percent rise in the aid to GDP ratio (or 60 percent rise in aid to government spending ratio) results in a 3 percent decline in ICRG and 1 percent decline in growth.
Knack also found that donor-sponsored "technical assistance" led countries in the wrong direction. MONGO's provide technical assistance to increase tourism in developing countries because tourism utilizes their competitive advantage (unique nature) to earn foreign exchange (Stonich, 1998) . Foreign exchange can be used to pay for (always popular) imports and keep the current account balanced, as conventional wisdom would recommend. These policies may not be in Nepal's best interest. Primavera (2000) , while reviewing past destruction and current efforts to restore mangroves in the Philippines, notes that multilateral organizations (World Bank, etc.) funded both the destruction and (now) restoration of the resources. The mangroves were destroyed for aquaculture-exports.
Is Nepal on the same road? The signs are not good. From a political-economic point of view, foreign MONGO's will not advocate ecological conservation if the result is fewer tourists. That result would displease HMG, the tourism industry and tourists from their home country. If ecological conservation fixed a problem (e.g., deforestation), it could even put some NGO's out of work. The solution of fewer tourists is therefore dismissed.
Instead of fewer tourists, MONGO's have supported "Fortress Conservation," ie, excluding all people from a park to keep it pristine for visitors. This works when the central government can provide funds but disaster results in the developing world. Local people rely heavily on their local wilderness and cannot be excluded easily without compensation; small budgets do not allow for either compensation or conservation (Hess Jr., 2001) . Teye et al. (2002) finds that people in Ghana resent "their" ecotourism projects (funded by blue-ribbon international agencies) because they are excluded from both decision-making and the protected areas. In Chitwan NP, Brown (1998) reports that the local resentment has led to poaching and illegal harvesting. Ironically, she also found that the removal of human influence has upset the ecosystem balance. Walder (2000) reports that restrictions on the local inhabitants of Sagarmatha led to non-cooperation and illegal activities; locally-managed ACAP was able to spread fuel-efficient technology and cut lodges' daily wood use in half from 220kg. The Nepali government, like any other, is complex. We need to keep three factors in mind while looking at Nepal's: first, the power structures between the ministries matter -one may overrule another; second, bureaucrats have the ability to follow their personal agenda -even if this conflicts with their job; 22 third, people in South Asia look to the government to solve their problems; this can augment the forces of inertia and delay necessary change.
Bureaucrats and Government -Wholesales Sellers
The Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation (DNPWC) is responsible for conservation measures in Sagarmatha NP (and others) but cannot regulate tourist activities in the park, which are the responsibility of the Ministry of Tourism (MT) (Nepal, 2000) . The interests of these two departments conflict -DNPWC pushes conservation, MT pushes tourist arrivals (Raj, 2001; Walder, 2000) . In the bureaucratic paradise of the Soviet Union, bureaucrats in charge of producing essentials won inter-ministry battles, even if the cost was high (Belova and Gregory, 2002) . In Nepal, the essential product is hard currency; you can see from figure 3 that MT has won. Part of the reason DNPWC has lost is accounting. Parks cost HMG $5 million per year, 23 but tourists only contribute $1 million per year to HMG. This deficit is deceiving; annual expenditure attributed to the parks is $27 million (Wells, 1993) .
As Gordon points out in his classic paper on fisheries, biologists with the goal of maximizing catch may have complete and logical scientific basis for their projections, but completely fail to account for the bioeconomic input costs (1954) . Given externalities, more tourists mean greater damage. Although the government acknowledges that tourism levels are at carrying capacity, its policy of opening new areas to tourism in the so-called "backward and underdeveloped" regions adds new destruction while reduces it nowhere (Brown et al., 1997) . HMG is content to earn foreign exchange (tourism "exports") in ways that MONGO's like; MONGO's will even pay for the clean-up costs once damage is done.
How about other solutions? More regulation, clearer ecotourism principles, or more eloquent codes of conduct? Damania (2002) takes a deep look at the intersection of environmental regulation and corruption. Without a competent judiciary, he finds that increased regulations may increase bribery and corruption but not change behavior. Even clean bureaucrats suffer: if a powerful ministry, citizen or politician wants to bend the rules, the choice is acquiescence or your head (Belova and Gregory, 2002; Primavera, 2000) .
Besides corruption in regulation, tourism attracts corrupt officials due to its characteristic risk, natural resources, and strong cash flows. Whether or not government officials participate directly in tourism, their incentive is to expand it for prestige, bribes, and/or personal rents (eg, as lodge owners). As an industry, tourism is vulnerable to outside manipulation.
Self-interested groups (tourists, tour organizations, MONGO's, HMG, and bureaucrats) who maximize their utilities via power, deceit, and/or hard currency care little about the costs of deforestation. The people of Nepal do face the costs associated with deforestation, as well as some benefits. If this balance changed, it would hurt the more powerful groups above them. Of course, the powerful claim that tourism will be the salvation of the "backward" poor, but actual facts indicate that powerful loggers are saving the forest by cutting its trees. The Conventional wisdom is that only a small portion of tourist revenues stay in the local communities (Nepal, 2000; Raj, 2001 ). These communities then consume resources valuable to the tourists because they are of little long-term value. Ecotourism recognizes this and proposes that locals who benefit from tourism will protect those resources. Taylor et al., curious about the huge migration from mainland Ecuador to the Galapagos (averaging 5.9 percent annually from [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] caused by this seemingly small benefit, found that the benefits from tourism, after considering multiplier effects, were much larger. So it seems that the local people are finding ways to benefit from tourism but not by enough to appreciably slow resource consumption -Taylor et al. projected that a 10 percent increase in tourism increased resource use by 4 percent. These impacts should make any eco-tourism advocate pause -recall that the HMG plans 5 percent annual arrival growth. In the quest for a portion of profits, local people perhaps lose the most for the smallest gain. This statement would be more powerful if we could define the winners and losers -among the local people -more clearly. Although the winners are evident (eg, Sherpas), the losers are perhaps harder to find. Long-term impacts are also hard to measure, if they are even of interest.
Local People -Production Input
When locals participate in eco-tourism, their patrimoine becomes a commodity for sale; a sustainable lifestyle changes to an extractive and consumptive lifestyle (King and Stewart, 1996; Bunting et al., 1991) . In addition, Sherpas working in tourism do not act as stewards of the land or forest -removing a traditional counterweight to resource consumption (Soussan et al., 1995; Walder, 2000) . Stonich (1998) examined the effects of tourism on households, the environment and economy of the Bay Islands of Honduras, which suffer from the same "hot spot" impacts as tourist sites in Nepal. In the Bay Islands, the poor suffer the results of overgrazing, unstable roads, overfishing, fresh-water shortage and water contamination. Although they are blamed, these effects are caused by the activities of wealthy locals and tourists (tourism growth was eight times higher than population growth over a six-year period). The wealthy avoid high fecal counts in the water supply with purified water. These impacts on water parallel the impacts on trees in Nepal, where tourists have much higher firewood consumption per capita. Since wood is overexploited in Nepal, increasing scarcity hurts the poor disproportionately. Poor women spend more time gathering wood. Family welfare suffers.
There is some evidence that resource depletion is rational. Locals chop trees to maximize revenue "while the good times last" even if they would prefer to have them later -if they were still there. After all, trendy tourists (as highlighted in Zurick (1992) and Papatheodorou (2001) ) are fickle and may go elsewhere, reducing future revenues based on eco-tourism to zero. Vosti's report (2002) on deforestation in Brazil concludes that farmers of "rainforest" beef in the Amazon are generally better off than before, since raising cattle (after clearing worthless trees) is the most profitable activity with scarce labor and distant markets. Government-built roads expand the areas under development in the same way as Nepal's tourist maximization policy expands the tourism sector's impacts.
In Brazil, secure property rights speed deforestation because farmers can get credit to expand their pasture. The situation would not be the same in Nepal, as a privately-held forest would be quite valuable as a source of firewood, a commodity of greater value than pasture in high, cold, and wet areas of Nepal. The parallel between Brazil and Nepal is in the incomplete markets for resources. If the Brazilian settler were able to collect carbon-sequestration fees (and if enforcement or monitoring were possible), deforestation would drop. If the Nepalis were able to own and sell their trees at market prices, deforestation would slow appreciably. In both cases, governments are partially responsible: Brazil's has encouraged transmigration to the "jungle;" 24 Nepal's has not allowed private land ownership and has encouraged tourist arrivals, while charging them a fraction of their reservation (maximum) price. Tourism contributes to deforestation; free wood makes it worse; and the locals reap small rewards in exchange for their future.
Models of the Market
The market for tourism in Nepal appears to be perfectly competitive (many suppliers with easy entry; many demanders facing low prices) and therefore meets the classical economic definition of sustainable (ie, no limitations which artificially constrain the actors). However, as we saw in sections three and four above, problems with the structure of the market (externalities, weak property rights and corruption), combined with imperfect information, have led actors to push the market for eco-tourism beyond carrying capacity. Although there is not much data on the specific impacts of tourism on the environment, via deforestation for example, the presence of externalities guarantees misallocation. Below, I set out the observed demand and supply curves which result from the forces and actors in sections three and four before discussing potential actions to correct the structure of the market and restore a sustainable balance. These actions rely on economic principles to address existing economic problems, increasing the chances for success. The demand curve slopes downward because fewer tourists want a destination as it becomes more expensive [as discussed in §2.1]. If a destination becomes less desirable, D Aggregate will shift in so that the quantity demanded at every price level is lower (see "D Shif tIn " in Figure 5 ).
To derive the Adventure Tourist aggregate demand curve (Figure 4 ), I started with Nepal's 1990-97 tourist arrival data and concentrated on the 15.5 percent of visitors who came for trekking. I combined this data with 1992-95 data from Bhutan and plotted the resulting points you see circled in the figure. Bhutan is a relatively unknown Himalayan country which limits tourism with the intention of maximizing revenue and minimizing impact; tourists must travel in groups and spend at least $200 a day. Arrivals are roughly one percent of Nepal's.
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I believe the resulting demand curve to be a continuous reflection of the quantity of "Himalayan culture and nature seekers" present at different price levels, ie, tourists to Bhutan and a subsection of tourists to Nepal share the same demand curve. This stylized demand curve seems to represent real demand without distortions, except for the effects of imperfect information.
Observed Supply
As discussed in §4.2, supply is very competitive but still allows some profits (rents). In Figure 5 , the stylized supply curve (S N epal ) is fairly flat (or elastic), but unobserved externality costs (included in S N Externality ) are increasingly significant. These curves are meant to represent the observed situation in Nepal as well as some generally accepted economic principles. Actual data would be almost impossible to find in publication but could be collected with enough time and money. Wells (1993) laments that economic impacts and economic values are not allowed to equate since tourists are willing to pay not only the cost of their impact but as much as their reservation price. Eighty percent of all trekkers surveyed in ACAP would pay more to protect the environment (Pobocik and Butalla, cited in Walder (2000) ). It seems clear that -although reservation prices of these tourists are not known -his start with-a strategy such as Bhutan's (limited access at a high price) would increase the proportion of tourists' willingness to pay. Solow (1974) observed that a monopolist is more interested in resource preservation than perfect competitors are. By holding back supply to maximize profits, the monopolist reduces demand and slows down environmental degradation. HMG, however, acts not as a preserving monopolist but as an enabler for private gain -opening remote areas to tourists degrades the areas for the benefits of only tourist and tour operators (Raj, 2001; Nepal, 2000) .
Exceptions, Consequences and Alternatives to the Model

Demand Alternatives
HMG can change the status quo. It can use its market power to, first, reduce the number of tourists and thereby their environmental impact and, second, increase revenue per tourist and thereby capture a larger share of the rents from both tourists and the tourism industry. Since externality costs would still exist, it must also improve property rights so that externality costs are internalized [addressed in §5.2.2] . These efforts and effects will overlap but lead to an efficient result.
HMG can regulate and control access, most obviously via visas, to both Nepal and the parks [discussed in §5.2.2]. Although HMG would want to set prices like a monopolist, competition between tourist destinations for custom limits power to an oligopoly level (Zurick, 1992; Papatheodorou, 2001 ). In Figure 6 , this partial market power is represented as M R θ=0.5 (ie, oligopoly power of θ = 0.5). Another benefit of rationed access could be income smoothing. Visas and park access could be cheaper in the low season. This would reduce the boom-bust results (two thirds of arrivals come in one third of the year) which fixed pricing and high volume tourism encourage (Brown et al., 1997) .
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If the government were to act as a monopolist, the entire market structure would change as rents were transferred from tourists and tour operators to the government. If externalities were internalized, additional rents would be transferred to property owners.
Market controls also have problems. Taxes or quotas will reduce tourist arrivals, but the efficiency of each must be weighted against the results of their implementation (Taylor, 2003) . Although taxes raise money for the government and quotas do not (they just result in queuing), large amounts of tax money are sure to lead to a "feeding frenzy" among competing bureaucrats (Leite and Weidmann, 1999) . One solution to this might be earmarking revenues to certain uses; another might include decentralized charges.
28 In addition, fewer tourists would lead to industry overcapacity and fierce competition until the market adjusted. This would be unpopular.
Supply Exceptions and Consequences
One is impressed with what a system of ideal markets, including futures markets, can accomplish in this complicated situation; and one can hardly miss seeing that our actual oligopolistic, politically-involved, pollution-producing industry is not exactly what the textbook ordered.
- Solow (1974) The difference between the real cost of firewood and the amount paid by the supplier is the externality cost or the cost of non-sustainability [as discussed in §3.2]. Charging more for previously "free" goods is hard; Primavera (2000) documents how industry can block efforts to charge even minimally-sustainable prices for "captive" state-resources. The inability of bureaucracy to enforce regulations does not help. 29 Primavera finds in the Philippines, as Stonich found in Honduras, that the rich and powerful (frequently the same people) will block change. The key to supply is internalization of externalities so that prices reflect true costs. This can only happen if property rights allow owners to price-ration supply. Hughes (2001) finds that parks are only sustainable when they can control who enters the park, what they do there, how much to charge, and how to spend that revenue. Besides this, a key ingredient is that the governance structure of the agency must be reformed to reflect and carry out its goals of both conservation and development. James et al. (2001) finds that parastatal agencies (semi-autonomous from the government, somewhat like ACAP) like have far higher budgets (200-400%) per square kilometer compared to their government-run cousins, which suffer from neglect and starvation (as we have seen with Nepal's national parks and even ACAP). A parastatal in Zimbabwe even remits 50 percent of its revenue as a tax to the central authority.
The parastatal system wisely involves the local people and improves their lives through direct projects aimed at both sustainability and livelihood enhancement. This involvement comes from self-interest; happy neighbors are good neighbors. As another feature, the parastatals' property rights help them not only to borrow for capital improvements (eg, visitor centers), but also allows private property owners to contribute and share in the management of the area -some even turn their land into reserves to capitalize on the main attraction next-door and thereby expand the ecologically-sustainable zone.
In Nepal, the situation would be the same if people could own land. They could use it for nature or timber services. In either case, the outcome would be both sustainable and maximize their utility, since the choice and the property were both theirs.
Sirubari is a Gurung village in the ACAP which has taken this approach. Emphasizing quality tourism, it charges US$80 for a three night package. About 50 percent of the tourist spending remains in the village. There has been little adverse cultural impact in the areaperhaps because only 250 tourists visit per year (Raj, 2001) . These small numbers are not failure, since volume is not the goal; each three-night tourist produces income equivalent to four months of per capita GDP.
Conclusions
Recommendations
The problems Nepal faces with its eco-tourism efforts are not unusual. In the many papers I reviewed for this one, I could not find an example of a sustainable government-run ecotourism program. All these programs suffer the same weakness -a lack of property rights. Before governments can reform their eco-tourism failures, they will have to give up or transfer some power. This will not be easy from a political-economic point of view, but MONGO pressure could help (since they appear to fit their acronym).
Property rights would shift the supply curve upward and inward to reflect true costs. If this happens, the demand curve will shift out because of the positive image of sustainability. At this point, property owners, parastatals, and the government could use oligopoly power to restrict supply and extract more rent from the tourists. This situation would be more sustainable than the current situation.
Different Perspectives
The situation in Nepal is complicated -like the world. Here, I summarize a few perspectives reflecting the range of debate: "Commodification" is the conversion of people, places and cultures into commodities to be consumed. As locals produce this product, it simultaneously destroys their culture. Tourists, confident that their way is best -mostly by virtue of purchasing power, destroy the very thing they came to visit (King and Stewart, 1996) . Brown (1998) asks: "Should the market values [of conserved biodiversity] of the rich in developed countries be more important than the non-market values of the poor in developing countries?" Nepalis (of various ethnic groups) are very interested in progress, trading, making money, watching movies from Bollywood, etc. Horrified outsiders concerned about culture and preservation need to keep in mind the local population's desire for "progress" -no matter how silly, irrelevant, or destructive it may seem (Nepal, 2000) .
Data Collection and Further Research
Is tourism in Nepal an efficient natural force which enhances the lives of the Nepalis -as Taylor, Vosti et al. might say -or a disaster that will destroy their environment -the opinion of Nepal, Stonich, Wells et al.? Right now, I side with the latter group, since it seems that Nepal has problems with externalities and power structures. Yes, everybody is maximizing their utility in a rational way, but the results of this utility maximization are not necessarily the results that any of these groups advocates or even wants.
As is often the case, the situation in Nepal is clouded by rhetoric and sparse data. Is tourism more important than foreign aid or forests to the government, to the MONGO's, or to the people? Which people? In this paper, I have attempted to present the economic forces at work so that one could understand the potential outcomes or aspects of the current situation. More research would be useful to clarify the situation. Nepal (2000) complains about the lack of long-term (time series, or panel) data on the tourism industry. This "accident" might not be. Information, as Belova and Gregory (2002) point out, might require ministries to meet goals or change objectives which might not be in their interest. The tourism industry is also uninterested in gathering too much data; not only is there a cost, but the data might reveal unpleasant patterns. Improving the collection and dissemination of data would be a good initial goal.
Further topics for research might include: a history of property rights and ownership patterns; measuring demand elasticity and tourists' willingness to pay (this allows HMG and the parks to understand their oligopoly coefficient, θ); a thorough analysis of national accounts and government expenditure to understand priorities, outcomes and internal dynamics; and a household survey of tourist-impacted areas (parks and surrounding) to understand the distribution of benefits and costs in local communities.
